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Abstract. Standard differential cryptanalysis uses statistical dependen-
cies between the difference of two plaintexts and the difference of the re-
spective two ciphertexts to attack a cipher. Here we introduce polytopic
cryptanalysis which considers interdependencies between larger sets of
texts as they traverse through the cipher. We prove that the methodol-
ogy of standard differential cryptanalysis can unambiguously be extended
and transferred to the polytopic case including impossible differentials.
We show that impossible polytopic transitions have generic advantages
over impossible differentials. To demonstrate the practical relevance of
the generalization, we present new low-data attacks on round-reduced
DES and AES using impossible polytopic transitions that are able to
compete with existing attacks, partially outperforming these.
1 Introduction
Without doubt is differential cryptanalysis one of the most important tools that
the cryptanalyst has at hand when trying to evaluate the security of a block
cipher. Since its conception by Biham and Shamir [2] in their effort to break the
Data Encryption Standard [26], it has been successfully applied to many block
ciphers such that any modern block cipher is expected to have strong security
arguments against this attack.
The methodology of differential cryptanalysis has been extended several
times with a number of attack vectors, most importantly truncated differen-
tials [19], impossible differentials [1,20], and higher-order differentials [19,22].
Further attacks include the boomerang attack [29], which bears some resem-
blance of second-order differential attacks, and differential-linear attacks [24].
Nonetheless many open problems remain in the field of differential crypt-
analysis. Although the concept of higher-order differentials is almost 20 years
old, it has not seen many good use cases. One reason has been the difficulty
of determining the probability of higher-order differentials accurately without
evaluating Boolean functions with prohibitively many terms. Thus the common
use case remains probability 1 higher-order differentials where we know that a
derivative of a certain order has to evaluate to zero because of a limit in the
degree of the function.
Another open problem is the exact determination of the success probability
of boomerang attacks and their extensions. It has correctly been observed that
the correlation between differentials must be taken into account to accurately
determine the success probability [25]. The true probability can otherwise deviate
arbitrarily from the estimated one.
Starting with Chabaud and Vaudenay [12], considerable effort has gone into
shedding light on the relation and interdependencies of various cryptographic
attacks (see for example [5,6,30]). With this paper, we offer a generalized view
on the various types of differential attacks that might help to understand both
the interrelation between the attacks as well as the probabilities of the attacks
better.
Our contribution
In this paper we introduce polytopic cryptanalysis. It can be viewed as a gener-
alization of standard differential cryptanalysis which it embeds as a special case.
We prove that the definitions and methodology of differential cryptanalysis can
unambiguously be extended to polytopic cryptanalysis, including the concept of
impossible differentials. Polytopic cryptanalysis is general enough to even en-
compass attacks such as higher-order differentials and might thus be valuable as
a reference framework.
For impossible polytopic transitions, we show that they exhibit properties
that allow them to be very effective in scenarios where ordinary impossible dif-
ferentials fail. This is mostly due to a generic limit in the diffusion of any block
cipher that guarantees that only a negligible number of all polytopic transitions
is possible for a sufficiently high choice of dimension. This also makes impossi-
ble polytopic transitions ideal for low-data attacks where standard impossible
differentials usually have a high data complexity.
Finally we prove that polytopic cryptanalysis is not only theoretically intrigu-
ing but indeed relevant for practical cryptanalysis by demonstrating competitive
impossible polytopic attacks on round-reduced DES and AES that partly out-
perform existing low-data attacks and offer different trade-offs between time and
data complexity.
In the appendix, we further prove that higher-order differentials can be ex-
pressed as truncated polytopic transitions and are hence a special case of these.
Thus higher-order differentials can be expressed in terms of a collection of poly-
topic trails just as differentials can be expressed as a collection of differential
trails. A consequence of this is that it is principally possible to determine lower
bounds for the probability of a higher-order differential by summing over the
probabilities of a subset of the polytopic trails which it contains.
Related work
To our knowledge, the concept of polytopic transitions is new and has not been
used in cryptanalysis before. Nonetheless there is other work that shares some
similarities with polytopic cryptanalysis.
Higher-order differentials [22] can in some sense also be seen as a higher-
dimensional version of a differential. However, most concepts of ordinary differ-
entials do not seem to extend to higher-order differentials, such as characteristics
or iterated differentials.
The idea of using several differentials simultaneously in an attack is not
new (see for example [4]). However as opposed to assuming independence of the
differentials, which does not hold in general (see [25]), we explicitly take their
correlation into account and use it in our framework.
Another type of cryptanalysis that uses a larger set of texts instead of a
single pair is integral cryptanalysis (see for example [3,14]), in which structural
properties of the cipher are used to elegantly determine a higher-order deriva-
tive to be zero without relying on bounds in the degree. These attacks can be
considered a particular form of higher-order differentials.
Finally decorrelation theory [28] also considers relations between multiple
plaintext-ciphertext pairs but takes a different direction by considering security
proofs based on a lack of correlation between the texts.
Organization of the paper
In Section 2, notation and concepts necessary for polytopic cryptanalysis are
introduced. It is demonstrated how the concepts of differential cryptanalysis
naturally extend to polytopic cryptanalysis. We also take a closer look at the
probability of polytopic transitions and applicability of simple polytopic crypt-
analysis.
In Section 3, we introduce impossible polytopic transitions. We show that
impossible polytopic transitions offer some inherent advantages over impossible
differentials and are particularly interesting for low-data attacks. We show that,
given an efficient method to determine the possibility of a polytopic transition,
generic impossible polytopic attack always exist.
In Section 4, we demonstrate the practicability of impossible polytopic transi-
tion attacks. We present some attacks on DES and AES that are able to compete
with existing attacks with low-data complexity, partially outperforming these.
Furthermore, in Appendix B truncated polytopic transitions are introduced.
We then give a proof that higher-order differentials are a special case of these.
The cryptanalytic ramifications of the fact that higher-order differentials consist
of polytopic trails are then discussed.
Notation
We use Fn2 to denote the n-dimensional binary vector space. To identify numbers
in hexadecimal notation we use a typewriter font as in 3af179. Random variables
are denoted with bold capital letters (X). We will denote d-difference (introduced
later) by bold Greek letters (α) and standard differences by Roman (i.e., non-
bold) Greek letters (α).
2 Polytopes and polytopic transitions
Classical differential cryptanalysis utilizes the statistical interdependency of two
texts as they traverse through the cipher. When we are not interested in the
absolute position of the two texts in the state space, the difference between the
two texts completely determines their relative positioning.
But there is no inherent reason that forces us to be restricted to only using
a pair of texts. Let us instead consider an ordered set of texts as they traverse
through the cipher.
Definition 1 (s-polytope). An s-polytope in Fn2 is an s-tuple of values in Fn2 .
Similar to differential cryptanalysis, we are not so much interested in the absolute
position of these texts but the relations between the texts. If we choose one of the
texts as the point of reference, the relations between all texts are already uniquely
determined by only considering their differences with respect to the reference
text. If we thus have d+ 1 texts, we can describe their relative positioning by a
tuple of d differences (see also Fig. 1).
Definition 2 (d-difference). A d-difference over Fn2 is a d-tuple of values in
Fn2 describing the relative position of the texts of a (d + 1)-polytope from one
point of reference.
When we reduce a (d + 1)-polytope to a corresponding d-difference, we loose
the information of the absolute position of the polytope. A d-difference thus
corresponds to an equivalence class of (d + 1)-polytopes where polytopes are
equivalent if and only if they can be transformed into each other by simple
shifting in state space. We will mostly be dealing with these equivalence classes.
m0
m1
m2
m3
Absolute positions of texts
with respect to origin
−→
m0
m1
m2
m3
Relative position-
ing to each other
−→
m0
m1
m2
m3
Relative positioning to
chosen reference text
Fig. 1. Depiction of three views of a polytope with four vertices.
In principal there are many d-differences that correspond to one (d + 1)-
polytope depending on the choice of reference text and the order of the differ-
ences. As a convention we will construct a d-difference from a (d + 1)-polytope
as follows:
Convention. For a (d + 1)-polytope (m0,m1, . . . ,md), the corresponding d-
difference is created as (m0 ⊕m1,m0 ⊕m2, . . . ,m0 ⊕md).
This means, we use the first text of the polytope as the reference text and write
the differences in the same order as the remaining texts of the polytope. We will
call the reference text the anchor of the d-difference. Hence if we are given a
d-difference and the value of the anchor, we can reconstruct the corresponding
(d+ 1)-polytope uniquely.
Example. Let (m0,m1,m2,m3) be a 4-polytope in Fn2 . Then (m0 ⊕ m1,m0 ⊕
m2,m0 ⊕m3) is the corresponding 3-difference with m0 as the anchor.
In the following, we will now show that we can build a theory of polytopic
cryptanalysis in which the same methodology as in standard differential crypt-
analysis applies. Standard differential cryptanalysis is contained in this frame-
work as a special case.
A short note regarding possible definitions of difference: in this paper we
restrict ourselves to XOR-differences as the most common choice. Most, if not
all, statements in this paper naturally extend to other definitions of difference,
e.g., in modular arithmetic.
The equivalent of a differential in polytopic cryptanalysis is the polytopic
transition. We use d-differences for the definition.
Definition 3 (Polytopic transition with fixed anchor). Let f : Fn2 → Fq2.
Let α be a d-difference (α1, α2, . . . , αd) over Fn2 and let β be the d-difference
(β1, β2, . . . , βd) over Fq2. By the (d+1)-polytopic transition α
f−→
x
β we denote that
f maps the polytope corresponding to α with anchor x to a polytope corresponding
to β. More precisely, we have α f−→
x
β if and only if
f(x⊕ α1)⊕ f(x) = β1
and f(x⊕ α2)⊕ f(x) = β2
. . .
and f(x⊕ αd)⊕ f(x) = βd.
Building up on this definition, we can now define the probability of a poly-
topic transition under a random anchor.
Definition 4 (Polytopic transition). Let f , α, and β again be as in Defini-
tion 3. The probability of the (d+ 1)-polytopic transition α f−→ β is then defined
as:
Pr
(
α
f−→ β
)
:= Pr
X
(
α
f−→
X
β
)
(1)
where X is a random variable, uniformly distributed on Fn2 . We will at times
also write α −→ β if the function is clear from the context or not important.
Note that this definition coincides with the definition of the differential proba-
bility when differences between only two texts (2-polytopes) are considered.
Let f : Fn2 → Fn2 now be a function that is the repeated composition of round
functions fi : Fn2 → Fn2 :
f := fr ◦ · · · ◦ f2 ◦ f1. (2)
Similarly to differential cryptanalysis, we can now define trails of polytopes:
Definition 5 (Polytopic trail). Let f be as in Eq. (2). A polytopic trail on f
is an (r + 1)-tuple of d-differences (α0,α1, . . . ,αr) written as
α0
f1−→ α1 f2−→ · · · fr−→ αr. (3)
The probability of such a polytopic trail is defined as
Pr
X
(
α0
f1−→
X
α1 and α1
f2−−−−→
f1(X)
α2 and · · · and αr−1 fr−−−−−−−−−→
fr−1◦···◦f1(X)
αr
)
(4)
where X is a random variable, distributed uniformly on Fn2 .
Similarly to differentials, it is possible to partition a polytopic transition over
a composed function into all polytopic trails that feature the same input and
output differences as the polytopic transition.
Proposition 1. The probability of a polytopic transition α0
f−→ αr over a func-
tion f : Fn2 → Fn2 , f = fr ◦ · · · ◦ f2 ◦ f1 is the sum of the probabilities of all
polytopic trails (α0,α1, . . . ,αr) which it contains:
Pr
(
α0
f−→ αr
)
=
∑
α1,...,αr−1
Pr
(
α0
f1−→ α1 f2−→ · · · fr−1−−−→ αr−1 fr−→ αr
)
(5)
where α0, . . . ,αr are d-differences and as such lie in Fdn2 .
Proof. If we fix the initial value of the anchor, we also fix the trail that the
polytope has to take. The set of polytopic trails gives us thus a partition of the
possible anchor values and in particular a partition of the anchors for which the
output polytope is of type αr. Using the above definitions we thus get:
Pr
(
α0
f−→ αr
)
= Pr
X
(
α0
f−→
X
αr
)
= 2−n ·
∣∣∣{x ∈ Fn2 ∣∣∣ α0 f−→
x
αr
}∣∣∣
= 2−n ·
∑
α1,...,αr−1
∣∣∣∣{x ∈ Fn2 ∣∣∣∣ α0 f1−→x α1, α1 f2−−−→f1(x) α2, . . .
. . . , αr−1
fr−−−−−−−−−→
fr−1◦···◦f1(x)
αr
}∣∣∣∣
=
∑
α1,...,αr−1
Pr
X
(
α0
f1−→
X
α1 and α1
f2−−−−→
f1(X)
α2 and . . .
. . . and αr−1
fr−−−−−−−−−→
fr−1◦···◦f1(X)
αr
)
=
∑
α1,...,αr−1
Pr
(
α0
f1−→ α1 f2−→ · · · fr−1−−−→ αr−1 fr−→ αr
)
which proves the proposition. uunionsq
To be able to calculate the probability of a differential trail, it is common
in differential cryptanalysis to make an assumption on the independence of the
round transitions. This is usually justified by showing that the cipher is a Markov
cipher and by assuming the stochastic equivalence hypothesis (see [23]). As we
will mostly be working with impossible trails where these assumptions are not
needed, we will assume for now that this independence holds and refer the in-
terested reader to Appendix A where the Markov model is adapted to polytopic
cryptanalysis.
Under the assumption that the single round transitions are independent, we
can work with polytopic transitions just as with differentials:
1. The probability of a polytopic transition is the sum of the probabilities of
all polytopic trails with the same input and output d-difference.
2. The probability of a polytopic trail is the product of the probabilities of the
1-round polytopic transitions that constitute the trail.
We are thus principally able to calculate the probability of a polytopic transition
over many rounds by knowing how to calculate the polytopic transition over
single rounds.
Now to calculate the probability of a 1-round polytopic transition, we can
use the following observations:
3. A linear function maps a d-difference with probability 1 to the d-difference
that is the result of applying the linear function to each single difference in
the d-difference.
4. Addition of a constant to the anchor leaves the d-difference unchanged.
5. The probability of a polytopic transition over an S-box layer is the product
of the polytopic transitions for each S-box.
We are thus able to determine probabilities of polytopic transitions and polytopic
trails just as we are used to from standard differential cryptanalysis.
A note on correlation, diffusion and the difference distribution table
When estimating the probability of a polytopic transition a first guess might
be that it is just the product of the individual 1-dimensional differentials. For a
3-polytopic transition we might for example expect:
Pr
(
(α0, α1) −→ (β0, β1)
) ?= Pr(α0 −→ β0) · Pr(α1 −→ β1).
That this is generally not the case is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let f : Fn2 → Fn2 . For a given input d-difference α the number of
output d-differences to which α is mapped with non-zero probability is upper
bounded by 2n.
Proof. This is just a result of the fact that the number of anchors for the tran-
sition is limited to 2n:∣∣∣{β ∈ Fdn2 ∣∣∣ Pr(α f−→ β) > 0}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{β ∈ Fdn2 ∣∣∣ ∃x ∈ Fn2 : α f−→
x
β
}∣∣∣ ≤ 2n
uunionsq
One implication of this limitation of possible output d-differences is a correlation
between differentials: the closer the distribution of differences of a function is to
a uniform distribution, the stronger is the correlation of differentials over that
function.
Example. Let us take the AES 8-bit S-box (denoted by S here) which is differ-
entially 4-uniform. Consider the three differentials, 7 S−→ 166, 25 S−→ 183, and
25 S−→ 1 which have probabilities 2−6, 2−6, and 2−7 respectively. The probabil-
ities of the polytopic transitions of the combined differentials deviate strongly
from the product of the single probabilities:
Pr
(
(7, 25) S−→ (166, 183)
)
= 2−6 > Pr
(
7 S−→ 166
)
· Pr
(
25 S−→ 183
)
= 2−12
Pr
(
(7, 25) S−→ (166, 1)
)
= 0 < Pr
(
7 S−→ 166
)
· Pr
(
25 S−→ 1
)
= 2−13.
Another consequence of Lemma 1 is that it sets an inherent limit to the
maximal diffusion possible over one round. A one d-difference can at most be
mapped to 2n possible d-differences over one round, the number of possible d-
differences reachable can only increase by a factor of 2n over each round. Thus
when starting from one d-difference, after one round at most 2n d-differences are
possible, after two rounds at most 22n differences are possible, after three rounds
at most 23n are possible and generally after round r at most 2rn d-differences
are possible.
In standard differential cryptanalysis, the number of possible output differ-
ences for a given input difference is limited by the state size of the function.
This is no longer true for d-differences: if the state space is Fn2 , the space of d-
differences is Fdn2 . The number of possible d-differences thus increases exponen-
tially with the dimension d. This has a consequence for the size of the difference
distribution table (DDT). For an 8-bit S-box, a classical DDT has a size of 216
entries, i.e., 64 kilobytes. But already the DDT for 3-differences has a size of 248,
i.e., 256 terabytes. Fortunately though, a third consequence of Lemma 1 is that
the DDT table is sparse for d > 1. As a matter of fact, we can calculate any row
of the DDT with a time complexity of 2n by trying out all possible values for
the anchor.
Relation to decorrelation theory. Decorrelation theory [28] is a framework
that can be used to design ciphers which are provably secure against a range of
attacks including differential and linear cryptanalysis. A cipher is called perfectly
decorrelated of order d when the image of any d-tuple of distinct plaintexts is
uniformly distributed on all d-tuples of ciphertexts with distinct values under a
uniformly distributed random key. It can for example be proved that a cipher
which is perfectly decorrelated of order 2 is secure against standard differential
and linear cryptanalysis.
When we consider (d+ 1)-polytopes in polytopic cryptanalysis, we can nat-
urally circumvent security proofs for order-d perfectly decorrelated ciphers. The
boomerang attack [29] for example – invented to break an order-2 perfectly
decorrelated cipher – can be described as a 4-polytopic attack.
Limitations of simple polytopic cryptanalysis
Can simple polytopic cryptanalysis, i.e., using a single polytopic transition, out-
perform standard differential cryptanalysis? Unfortunately this is generally not
the case as is shown in the following.
Definition 6. Let α −→ β be a (d + 1)-polytopic transition with d-differences
α and β. Let α′ −→ β′ be a d′-difference with d′ ≤ d. We then write (α′,β′) v
(α,β) if and only if for each i ∈ [1, d′] there exists j ∈ [1, d] such that the ith
differences in α′ and β′ correspond to the jth differences in α and β.
Using this notation, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let α −→ β be a (d+ 1)-polytopic transition and let α′ −→ β′ be a
(d′ + 1)-polytopic transition with d′ ≤ d and (α′,β′) v (α,β). Then
Pr (α −→ β) ≤ Pr (α′ −→ β′) . (6)
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that α f−→
x
β implies α′ f−→
x
β′. uunionsq
In words, the probability of a polytopic transition is always at most as high as
the probability of any lower dimensional polytopic transition that it contains. In
particular, it can never have a higher probability than any standard differential
that it contains.
It can in some instances still be profitable to use a single polytopic transi-
tion instead of a standard differential that it contains. This is the case when the
probability of the polytopic transition is the same as (or close to) the probability
of the best standard differential it contains. Due to the fact that the space of d-
differences is much larger than that of standard differentials (2dn vs. 2n), one set
of texts that follows the polytopic transition is usually enough to distinguish the
biased distribution from a uniform distribution as opposed to standard differen-
tials where at least two are needed. Nonetheless the cryptanalytic advantages of
polytopic cryptanalysis lie elsewhere as we will see in the next sections.
3 Impossible polytopic cryptanalysis
Impossible differential cryptanalysis makes use of differentials with probability
zero to distinguish a cipher from an ideal cipher. In this section, we extend the
definition to encompass polytopic transitions.
Impossible polytopic cryptanalysis offers distinct advantages over standard
impossible differential cryptanalysis that are a result of the exponential increase
in the size of the space of d-differences with increasing dimension d. This not
only allows impossible (d + 1)-polytopic attacks using just a single set of d + 1
chosen plaintexts, it also allows generic distinguishing attacks on (d− 1)-round
block ciphers whenever it is computationally easy to determine whether a (d+1)-
polytopic transition is possible or not. We elaborate this in more detail later in
this section.
Definition 7. An impossible (d + 1)-polytopic transition is a (d + 1)-polytopic
transition that occurs with probability zero.
In impossible differential attacks, we use knowledge of an impossible differ-
ential over r− 1 rounds to filter out wrong round key guesses for the last round:
any round key that decrypts a text pair such that their difference adheres to the
impossible differential has to be wrong. The large disadvantage of this attack
is that it always requires a large number of text pairs to sufficiently reduce the
number of possible keys. This is due to the fact that the filtering probability
corresponds to the fraction of the impossible differentials among all differen-
tials. Unfortunately for the attacker, most ciphers are designed to provide good
diffusion, such that this ratio is usually low after a few rounds.
This is exactly where the advantage of impossible polytopic transitions lies.
Due to the exponential increase in the size of the space of d-differences (from
Fn2 to Fdn2 ) and the limitation of the diffusion to maximally a factor of 2n (see
Lemma 1), the ratio of possible (d+1)-polytopic transitions to impossible (d+1)-
polytopic transitions will be low for many more rounds than possible for standard
differentials. In fact, by increasing the dimension d of the polytopic transition,
it can be assured that the ratio of possible to impossible polytopic transitions is
close to zero for an almost arbitrary number of rounds.
An impossible (d+ 1)-polytopic attack could then proceed as follows. Let n
be the block size of the cipher and let l be the number of bits in the last round
key.
1. Choose a d and a d-difference such that the ratio of possible to impossible
(d+ 1)-polytopic transitions is lower than 2−l−1.
2. Get the r-round encryption of d+1 plaintexts chosen such that they adhere
to the input d-difference.
3. For each guess of the round key kr decrypt the last round. If the obtained
d-difference after the (r−1)th round is possible, keep the key as a candidate.
Otherwise discard it.
Clearly this should leave us on average with one round key candidate which
is bound to be the correct one. In practice, an attack would likely be more
complex, e.g., with only partially guessed round keys and tradeoffs in the filtering
probability and the data/time complexities.
While the data complexity is limited to d+1 chosen plaintexts (and thus very
low), the time complexity is harder to determine and depends on the difficulty
of determining whether an obtained (r − 1)-round (d + 1)-polytopic transition
is possible or not. The straightforward approach is to precompute a list of pos-
sible d-differences after round r − 1. Both the exponentially increasing memory
requirements and the time of the precomputation limit this approach though. In
spite of this, attacks using this approach are competitive with existing low-data
attacks as we show in Section 4.
One possibility to reduce the memory complexity is to use a meet-in-the-
middle approach where one searches for a collision in the possible d-differences
reachable from the input d-difference and the calculated d-difference after round
(r− 1) at a round somewhere in the middle of the cipher. This however requires
to repeat the computation for every newly calculated d-difference and thus limits
its use in the scenario where we calculated a new d-difference after round (r−1)
for each key guess (not in a distinguishing attack though).
Clearly any method that could efficiently determine the impossibility of most
impossible polytopic transitions would prove extremely useful in an attack. In-
tuitively it might seem that it is generally a hard problem to determine the
possibility of a polytopic transition. As a matter of fact though, there already
exists a cryptographic technique that provides a very efficient distinguisher for
certain types of polytopic transitions, namely higher-order differentials which
are shown in Appendix B to correspond to truncated polytopic transitions. This
raises the hope that better distinguishing techniques could still be discovered.
There is one important further effect of the increase in the size of the differ-
ence space: it allows us to restrict ourselves to impossible d-differences on only a
part of the state. It is even possible to restrict the d-difference to a d-difference
in one bit and still use it for efficient filtering.1 In Section 4 we will use these
techniques in impossible polytopic attacks to demonstrate the validity of the
attacks and provide a usage scenario.
Wrong keys and random permutations
Note that while impossible polytopic attacks – just like impossible differential
attacks – do not require the stochastic equivalence hypothesis, practical attacks
require another hypothesis: the wrong-key randomization hypothesis. This hy-
pothesis states that when decrypting one or several rounds with a wrong key
guess creates a function that behaves like a random function. For our setting,
we formulate it is as following:
Wrong-key randomization hypothesis. When decrypting one or multiple
rounds of a block cipher with a wrong key guess, the resulting polytopic tran-
sition probability will be close to the transition probability over a random per-
mutation for almost all key guesses.
Let us therefore take a look at the polytopic transition probabilities over
random functions and random permutation. To simplify the treatment, we make
the following definition:
1 In standard differential cryptanalysis, this would require a probability 1 truncated
differential.
Definition 8 (Degenerate d-difference). Let α be a d-difference over Fn2 :
α = (α1, . . . , αd). We call α degenerate if there exists an i with 1 ≤ i ≤ d with
αi = 0 or if there exists a pair i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d and αi = αj. Otherwise
we call α non-degenerate.
Clearly if and only if a d-difference α is degenerate, there exist two texts in
the underlying (d + 1)-polytope that are identical. To understand the transi-
tion probability of a degenerate d-difference it is thus sufficient to evaluate the
transition probability of a non-degenerate d′-difference (d′ < d) that contains
the same set of texts. For the following two propositions, we will thus restrict
ourselves to non-degenerate d-differences.
Proposition 2 (Distribution over random function). Let α be a non-
degenerate d-difference over Fn2 . Let F be a uniformly distributed random func-
tion from Fn2 to Fm2 . The image of α is then uniformly distributed over all
d-difference over Fm2 . In particular Pr
(
α
F−→ β
)
= 2−md for any d-difference
β ∈ (Fm2 )d.
Proof. Let (m0,m1, . . . ,md) be a (d+ 1)-polytope that adheres to α. Then the
polytope (F(m0),F(m1), . . . ,F(md)) is clearly uniformly randomly distributed
on (Fm2 )d+1 and accordingly β with α
F−→ β is distributed uniformly randomly
on (Fm2 )d. uunionsq
For the image of a d-difference over a random permutation, we have a similar
result:
Proposition 3 (Distribution over random permutation). Let α be a non-
degenerate d-difference over Fn2 . Let F be a uniformly distributed random per-
mutation on Fn2 . The image of α is then uniformly distributed over all non-
degenerate d-difference over Fn2 .
Proof. Let (m0,m1, . . . ,md) be a (d+1)-polytope that adheres to α. As α is non-
degenerate, all mi are distinct. Thus the polytope (F(m0),F(m1), . . . ,F(md)) is
clearly uniformly randomly distributed on all (d+1)-polytopes in (Fm2 )d+1 with
distinct values. Accordingly β with α F−→ β is distributed uniformly randomly
on all non-degenerate d-differences over Fn2 . uunionsq
As long as d  2n, we can thus well approximate the probability Pr
(
α
F−→ β
)
by 2−dn when β is non-degenerate.
In the following, these proposition will be useful when we try to estimate
the probability that a partial decryption with a wrong key guess will still give
us a possible intermediate d-difference. We will then always assume that the
wrong-key randomization hypothesis holds and that the probability of getting
a particular d-difference on m bits is the same as if we had used a random
permutation, i.e., it is 2−dm (as our d is always small).
4 Impossible polytopic attacks on DES and AES
Without much doubt are the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [26] and the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [15] the most studied and best cryptan-
alyzed block ciphers. Any cryptanalytic improvement on these ciphers should
thus be a good indicator of the novelty and quality of a new cryptanalytic at-
tack. We believe that these ciphers thus pose ideal candidates to demonstrate
that the generalization of differential cryptanalysis to polytopic cryptanalysis is
not a mere intellectual exercise but useful for practical cryptanalysis.
In the following, we demonstrate several impossible polytopic attacks on
reduced-round versions of DES and AES that make only use of a very small
set of chosen plaintexts. The natural reference frame for these attacks are hence
low-data attacks. In Table 1 and in Table 2 we compare our attacks to other
low-data attacks on round-reduced versions of DES and AES respectively. We
should mention here that [11] only states attacks on 7 and 8 rounds of DES.
It is not clear whether the techniques therein could also be used to improve
complexities of meet-in-the-middle attacks for 5- and 6-round versions of that
cipher.
We stress here that in contrast to at least some of the other low-data at-
tacks, our attacks make no assumption on the key schedule and work equally
well with independent round keys. In fact, all of our attacks are straight-forward
applications of the ideas developed in this paper. There is likely still room for im-
provement of these attacks using details of the ciphers and more finely controlled
trade-offs.
In all of the following attacks, we determine the possibility or impossibility
of a polytopic transition by deterministically generating a list of all d-differences
that are reachable from the starting d-difference, i.e., we generate and keep a list
of all possible d-differences. The determination of these lists is straightforward
using the rules described in Section 2. The sizes of these lists are the limiting
factors of the attacks both for the time and the memory complexities.
4.1 Attacks on the DES
For a good reference for the DES, we refer to [21]. A summary of the results for
DES can be found in Table 1.
A 5-round attack. Let us start with an impossible 4-polytopic attack on 5-
round DES. We split our input 3-difference into two parts, one for the left 32
state bits and one for the right 32 state bits. Let us denote the left 3-difference
as (α, β, γ). For the right half we choose the 3-difference (0, 0, 0). This allows us
to pass the first round for free (as can be seen in Fig. 2).
The number of possible 3-differences after the second round depends now on
our choice of α, β, and γ. To keep this number low, clearly it is good to choose
the differences to activate as few S-boxes as possible. We experimentally tried
out different natural choices and chose the values
(α, β, γ) = (02000000, 04000000, 06000000).
Table 1. Comparison table of low-data attacks on round-reduced DES. Data complex-
ity is measured in number of required known plaintexts (KP) or chosen plaintexts (CP).
Time complexity is measured in round-reduced DES encryption equivalents. Memory
complexity is measured in plaintexts (8 bytes). For the other attacks no memory re-
quirements were explicitly specified in the publications. They should be low though.
The attacks of this paper are in bold.
Rounds Attack Type Time Data Memory Source
5 Differential > 211.7 64 CP - As in [18]
Linear > 213.8 72 CP - As in [18]
MitM 245.5 1 KP - From [13]
MitM 237.9 28 KP - From [18]
MitM 230 8 CP - From [18]
Imp. polytopic 213.2 4 CP 29 This paper
6 Differential 213.7 256 CP - As in [18]
Linear 213.9 >104 KP - As in [18]
MitM 251.8 1 KP - From [18]
Truncated diff. 248 7 CP - From [19]
Truncated diff. 211.8 46 CP - From [19]
Imp. polytopic 232.2 4 CP 210 This paper
Imp. polytopic 218.4 48 CP 29 This paper
7 MitM Sieve 253 1 KP - From [11]
Imp. polytopic 243 16 CP 243 This paper
Imp. polytopic 237.8 48 CP 210 This paper
8 MitM Sieve 253 16 KP - From [11]
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Fig. 2. Outline of the 5-round attack on DES.
All of these three differences only activate S-box 2 in round 2. With this choice
we get 35 possible 3-differences after round 2. Note that the left 3-difference is
still (α, β, γ) after round 2 while the 35 variations only appear in the right half.
As discussed earlier, the maximal number of output d-differences for a fixed
input d-difference is inherently limited by the size of the domain of the function.
A consequence of this is that for any of the 35 3-differences after round 2 the
possible number of output 3-differences of any S-box in round 3 is limited to 26
as shown in Fig. 2. But by guessing the 6 bits of round key 5 that go into the
corresponding S-box in round 5, we can determine the 3-difference in the same
four output bits of round 3 now coming from the ciphertexts. For the right guess
of the 6 key bits, the determined 3-difference will be possible. For a wrong key
guess though, we expect the 3-difference to take a random value in the set of all
3-differences on 4 bits.
But the size of the space of 3-differences in these four output bits is now
24·3 = 212. Thus when fixing one of the 35 possible 3-differences after round 2,
we expect on average to get one suggestion for the 6 key bits in that S-box.
Repeating this for every S-box, we get on average one suggestion for the last
round key for each of the 35 possible 3-differences after round 2, leaving us with
an average of 35 key candidates for the last round key.
What are the complexities of the attack? Clearly we only need 4 chosen
plaintexts. For the time complexity we get the following: For each of the 35
possible 3-differences after round 2, we have to determine the 26 possible output
3-differences and for each of these, we have to see in the list of possible 3-
differences obtained from the key guesses whether there is a guess of the 6 key
bits that gives us exactly that 3-difference. Thus we have a total of 35·8·26 = 214.2
steps each of which should be easier than one round of DES encryption. This
leaves us with a time complexity of ≈ 212 5-round DES encryptions equivalents.
But to completely determine the DES key we need 8 additional bits that are
not present in the last round key. As we expect on average maximally 35 round
keys, we are left with trying out the 35 · 28 = 213.2 full key candidates, setting
the time complexity of this attack to that value.
The only memory requirement in this attack is storing the list of possible
3-differences for each key guess in each S-box. This should roughly be no more
than 212 bytes.
A 6-round attack. The 6-round attack proceeds exactly as the 5-round at-
tack, with the only difference being that instead of determining the possible
3-difference output of each S-box in round 3, we do the same in round 4 and
thus have to repeat the attack for every possible 3-difference after round 3.
Experimental testing revealed that it is beneficial for this attack to choose a
different choice of α, β, and γ, namely
(α, β, γ) = (20000000, 40000000, 60000000),
which now activates S-box 1 instead of S-box 2 as it gives us the lowest number
of 3-differences after round 3. For this choice, we get a number of 48 possible
3-differences after round 2 and 224.12 possible 3-differences after round 3. Now
substituting 35 with this number in the previous attack, gives us the time com-
plexity for this 6-round attack.
A note regarding the memory requirement of this attack: As we loop over
the 224.12 possible 3-differences after round 3, we are not required to store all of
them at any time. By doing the attack while creating these possible 3-differences
we can keep the memory complexity nearly as low as before, namely to roughly
213 bytes.
A 7-round attack. Unfortunately extending from 6 to 7 rounds as done when
going from 5 to 6 rounds is not possible, due to the prohibitively large number
of possible 3-differences after round 4. Instead we use a different angle.
It is well known that when attacking r-round DES, guessing the appropriate
36 round key bits of the last round key and the appropriate 6 bits of the round
key in round r−1 allows us to determine the output state bits of an S-box of our
choice after round r−3. We will thus restrict ourselves to looking for impossible
d-differences in only one S-box. We choose S-box 1 here.
In order to have a sufficiently high success rate, we need to increase the
dimension of our polytopic transitions to increase the size of the d-difference
space of the four output bits of the S-box of our choice. For this attack we
choose d = 15 giving us a 15-difference space size of 260 in four bits.
For our choice of input 15-difference, we again leave all differences in the
right side to 0, while choosing for the 15-difference on the left side:(
00000002, 00000004, 00000006, 02000000, 02000002, 02000004,
02000006, 04000000, 04000002, 04000004, 04000006, 06000000,
06000002, 06000004, 06000006
)
which only activates S-boxes 2 and 8. For this choice of input 15-difference we
get 1470 possible 15-differences after round 2 and 236.43 possible 15-differences
after round 3.
For each of these 236.43 possible 15-differences after round 3, we calculate the
26 possible output 15-differences of S-box 1 after round 4. Now having precom-
puted a list of possible 15-differences in the output bits of S-box 1 after round 4
for each of the 242 guessed key bits of round 7 and 6, we can easily test whether
we get a collision. What is the probability of this? The 15-difference space size
in the four bits is 260 and, we get maximally 242 possible 15-differences from the
key guesses. This leaves us with a chance of 2−18 that we find a 15-difference
in that list. Thus for each of the 236.43 possible 15-differences after round 3, we
expect on average at most 2−12 suggestions for the guessed 42 key bits, a total
of 224.43 suggestions.
What are the complexities for this attack? Clearly again, the data complexity
is 16 chosen plaintexts. For the time complexity, for each of the 242.42 possible
4-bit 15-differences obtained after round 4, we have to see whether it is contained
in the list of 242 3-differences which we obtained from the key guesses. To do
this efficiently, we first have to sort the list which should take 242 · 42 = 247.4
elementary steps. Assuming that a 7-round DES encryption takes at least 42
elementary steps, we can upperbound this complexity with 242 DES encryption
equivalents. As finding an entry in a list of 242 entries also takes approximately
42 elementary steps, this leaves us with a total time complexity of at most 243
7-round DES encryption equivalents. As each suggestion gives us 42 DES key
bits and as the list of suggestions has a size of 224.23, we can find the correct
full key with 238.23 7-round DES trial encryptions which is lower than then the
previously mentioned time complexity and can thus be disregarded.
The data complexity is determined by the size of the list of 4-bit 15-differences
generated from the key guesses. This gives us a memory requirement of 242(15 ·
4 + 42) bits ≈ 246 bytes.
Extension of the attacks using more plaintexts. The attacks for 5 and 6
rounds can be extended by one round at the cost of a higher data complexity.
The extension can be made at the beginning of the cipher in the following way.
Let us suppose we start with a 3-difference (δ1, δ2, δ3) in the left half and
the 3-difference (α, β, γ) in the right half. If we knew the output 3-difference of
the round function in the first round, we could choose (δ1, δ2, δ3) accordingly to
make sure that we end up at the starting position of the original attack. Thus
by guessing this value and repeating the attack for each guessed value of this
3-difference we can make sure we still retrieve the key.
Fortunately the values of (α, β, γ) are already chosen to give a minimal num-
ber of possible 3-difference in the round function. Thus the time complexity only
increases by this value, i.e., 35 and 48. The data complexity increases even less.
As it turns out, 12 different values for the left half of the input text are enough
to generate all of the 35 resp. 48 3-differences. Thus the data complexity only
increases to 48 chosen plaintexts.
We should mention that the same technique can be used to extend the 7-
round attack to an 8-round attack. But this leaves us with the same time com-
plexity as the 8-round attack in [11], albeit at a much higher data cost.
Experimental results. To verify the correctness of the above attacks and
their complexities, we implemented the 5-round and 6-round attacks that use
4 chosen plaintexts. We ran the attacks on a single core of an Intel Core i5-
4300U processor. We ran the 5-round attack 100000 times which took about 140
seconds. The average number of suggested round keys was 47 which is slightly
higher than the expected number of 35. The suggested number of round keys was
below 35 though in 84 percent of the cases and below 100 in 95 percent of the
cases. In fact, the raised average is created by a few outliers in the distribution:
taking the average on all but the 0.02 percent worst cases, we get 33.1 round key
suggestions per case. While this shows that the estimated probability is generally
good, it also demonstrates that the wrong-key randomization hypothesis has to
be handled with care.
Running the six-round attack 10 times, an attack ran an average time of
10 min and produced an average of 222.3 candidates for the last round key. As
expected, the correct round key was always in the list of candidate round keys
for both the 5-round and 6-round attacks.
4.2 Attacks on the AES
For a good reference for the AES, we refer to [15]. A summary of the results for
AES can be found in Table 2.
Table 2. Comparison table of low-data attacks on round-reduced AES. Data com-
plexity is measured in number of required chosen plaintexts (CP). Time complexity is
measured in round-reduced AES encryption equivalents. Memory complexity is mea-
sured in plaintexts (16 bytes). The column ‘keyschedule’ denotes whether the attacks
use the AES key schedule. All attacks that rely on the keyschedule are attacks on
AES-128. The attacks of this paper are in bold.
Rounds Attack Type Time Data Memory Keyschedule Source
4 Guess & Det. 2120 1 KP 2120 Yes As in [10]
Diff. MitM 2104 3 CP 1 Yes As in [8,9]
Guess & Det. 280 2 CP 280 Yes As in [10]
Guess & Det. 232 4 CP 224 Yes As in [10]
Imp. polytopic 238 8 CP 215 No This paper
5 MitM 264 8 CP 256 Yes As in [17], Sec. 7.5.1
Imp. polytopic 270 15 CP 241 No This paper
A 4-round attack. We first present here an impossible 8-polytopic attack on
4-round AES. For the input 7-difference, we choose a 7-difference that activates
only the first byte, i.e., that is all-zero in all other bytes. Such a 7-difference
can be mapped after round 1 to at most 28 different 7-differences. If we restrict
ourselves to the 7-differences in the first column after round 2, we can then at
most have 216 different 7-differences in this column. In particular, we can have
at most have 216 different 7-differences in the first byte. For a depiction of this,
see Fig. 3.
If we now request the encryptions of 8 plaintexts that adhere to our chosen
start 7-difference, we can now determine the corresponding 7-difference after
round 2 in the first byte by guessing 40 round key bits of round keys 3 and 4. If
this 7-difference does not belong to the set of 216 possible ones, we can discard
the key guess as wrong.
How many guesses of the 40 key bits, do we expect to survive the filtering?
There are 256 possible 7-difference on a byte and only 216 possible ones coming
from our chosen input 7-difference. This leaves a chance of 2−40 for a wrong key
guess to produce a correct 7-difference. We thus expect on average 2 suggestions
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Fig. 3. Diffusion of the starting 7-difference for the 4-round attack on AES. The letter
A shows a byte position in which a possible 7-difference is non-zero and known. A dot
indicates a byte position where the 7-difference is known to be zero. A question mark
indicates a byte position where arbitrary values for the 7-differences are allowed. In
total there are 216 different 7-differences possible in the first column after the second
round.
for the 40 key bits, among them the right one. To determine the remaining
round key bits, we can use the same texts, only restricting ourselves to different
columns.
The data complexity of the attack is limited to 8 chosen plaintexts. The time
complexity is dominated by determining the 7-difference in the first byte after
round 2 for each guess of the 40 key bits and checking whether it is among the 216
possible ones. This can be done in less than 16 table lookups on average for each
key guess. Thus the time complexity corresponds to 240 ·2−2 = 238 4-round AES
encryption equivalents, assuming one 4-round encryption corresponds to 4 · 16
table lookups. The memory complexity is limited to a table of the 216 allowed
7-difference in one byte, corresponding to 219 bytes or 215 plaintext equivalents.
A 5-round attack. In this attack, we are working with 15-polytopes and trace
the possible 14-differences one round further than in the 4-round attack. Again
we choose our starting 14-difference such that it only activates the first byte.
After two rounds we then have maximally 240 different 14-differences on the
whole state. If we restrict ourselves to only the first column of the state after
round 3, we then get an additional 232 possible 14-differences in this column
for each of the 240 possible 14-differences after round 2, resulting in a total of
272 possible 14-differences in the first column after round 3. This is depicted in
Fig. 4. In particular again, we can have at most have 272 different 14-differences
in the first byte.
Let us suppose now we have the encrypted values of a 15-polytope that
adheres to our starting 14-difference. We can then again find the respective 14-
difference in the first byte after the third round by guessing 40 key bits in round
keys 4 and 5. There are in total 2112 different 14-differences in one byte. The
chance of a wrong key guess to produce one of the possible 272 14-differences is
thus 2−40. We thus expect on average 2 suggestions for the 40 key bits, among
them the right one. To determine the remaining round key bits, we can again
use the same texts but restricting ourselves to a different column.
To lower the memory complexity of this attack it is advantageous to not
store the 272 possible 14-differences but store for each of the 240 key guesses
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Fig. 4. Diffusion of the starting 14-difference for the 5-round attack on AES. The letter
A shows a byte position in which a possible 14-difference is non-zero and known. A dot
indicates a byte position where the 14-difference is known to be zero. A question mark
indicates a byte position where arbitrary values for the 14-differences are allowed. In
total there are 272 different 14-differences possible in the first column after the third
round.
the obtained 14-difference. This gives a memory complexity of 240 · (14 + 5)
bytes corresponding to 241 plaintext equivalents. The time complexity is then
dominated by constructing the 272 possible 14-differences and testing whether
they correspond to one of the key guesses. This should not take more than the
equivalent of 272 · 16 table lookups resulting in a time complexity of 270 5-round
AES encryption equivalents. The data complexity is restricted to the 15 chosen
plaintexts needed to construct one 15-polytope corresponding to the starting
14-difference.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed and studied polytopic cryptanalysis. We were able
to show that the methodology and notation of standard cryptanalysis can be
unambiguously extended to polytopic cryptanalysis, including the concept of
impossible differentials. Standard differential cryptanalysis remains as a special
case of polytopic cryptanalysis.
For impossible polytopic transitions, we demonstrated that both the increase
in the size of the space of d-differences and the inherent limit in the diffusion of
d-differences in a cipher allow them to be very effective in settings where ordinary
impossible differentials fail. This is the case when the number of rounds is so
high that impossible differentials do no longer exist or when the allowed data
complexity is too low.
Finally we showed the practical relevance of this framework by demonstrating
novel low-data attacks on DES and AES that are able to compete with existing
attacks.
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A Markov model in polytopic cryptanalysis
To develop the Markov model, we first need to introduce keys in the function over
which the transitions take place. We will thus restrict our discussion to product
ciphers i.e., block ciphers that are constructed through repeated composition of
round functions. In contrast to Eq. (2), each round function f i is now keyed with
its own round key ki which itself is derived from the key k of the cipher via a
key schedule.2 We can then write the block cipher fk as:
fk := frkr ◦ · · · ◦ f2k2 ◦ f1k1 . (7)
The first assumption that we now need to make, is that the round keys are
independent. The second assumption is that the product cipher is a Markov
cipher. Here we adopt the notion of a Markov cipher from [23] to polytopic
cryptanalysis:
Definition 9. A product cipher is a (d+1)-polytopic Markov cipher if and only
if for all round functions f i, for any (d+1)-polytopic transition α −→ β for that
round function and any fixed inputs x, y ∈ Fn2 , we have
Pr
K
(
α
fiK−−→
x
β
)
= Pr
K
(
α
fiK−−→
y
β
)
(8)
where K is a random variable distributed uniformly over the spaces of round
keys.
In words, a cipher is a (d+ 1)-polytopic Markov cipher if and only if the prob-
abilities of 1-round (d + 1)-polytopic transitions do not depend on the specific
anchor as long as the round key is distributed uniformly at random. For d = 1,
the definition coincides with the classical definition.
Just as with the standard definition of Markov ciphers, most block ciphers are
(d+ 1)-polytopic Markov ciphers for any d as the round keys are usually added
to any part of the state that enters the non-linear part of the round function
(for a counterexample, see [16]). Examples of (d + 1)-polytopic Markov ciphers
are SPN ciphers such as AES [15] or PRESENT [7], and Feistel ciphers such as
DES [26] or CLEFIA [27]. We are not aware of any cipher that is Markov in the
classical definition but not (d+ 1)-polytopic Markov.
In the following, we extend the central theorem from [23] (Theorem 2) to the
case of (d+ 1)-polytopes.
Theorem 1. Let fk = frkr ◦ · · · ◦ f1k1 be a (d+ 1)-polytopic Markov cipher with
independent round keys, chosen uniformly at random and let δ0, δ1, . . . , δr be a
series of d-differences such that δ0 is the input d-difference of round 1 and δi
is the output d-difference of round i of some fixed input (d + 1)-polytope. The
series δ0, δ1, . . . , δr then forms a Markov chain.
The following proof follows the lines of the original proof from [23].
2 For a clearer notation, we moved the index from subscript to superscript.
Proof. We limit ourselves here to showing that
Pr
K1,K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−−−→
f1K1
(x)
δ2
∣∣∣∣∣ δ0 f1K1−−→x δ1
)
= Pr
K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−→
z
δ2
)
(9)
where x and z are any elements from Fn2 and K1 and K2 are distributed uni-
formly at random over their respective round key spaces and the conditioned
event has positive probability. The theorem then follows easily by induction and
application of the same arguments to the other rounds.
For any x, z ∈ Fn2 , we now have
Pr
K1,K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−−−→
f1K1
(x)
δ2 and δ0
f1K1−−→
x
δ1
)
=
∑
y∈Fn2
Pr
K1,K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−→
y
δ2 and δ0
f1K1−−→
x
δ1 and f1K1(x) = y
)
=
∑
y∈Fn2
Pr
K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−→
y
δ2
)
· Pr
K1
(
δ0
f1K1−−→
x
δ1 and f1K1(x) = y
)
= Pr
K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−→
z
δ2
)
·
∑
y∈Fn2
Pr
K1
(
δ0
f1K1−−→
x
δ1 and f1K1(x) = y
)
= Pr
K2
(
δ1
f2K2−−→
z
δ2
)
· Pr
K1
(
δ0
f1K1−−→
x
δ1
)
where the second equality comes from the independence of keys K1 and K2 and
the third equality comes from the Markov property of the cipher. From this,
Eq. (9) follows directly. uunionsq
The important consequence of the fact that the sequence of d-differences
forms a Markov chain is that, just as in standard differential cryptanalysis, the
average probability of a particular polytopic trail with respect to independent
random round keys is the product of the single polytopic 1-round transitions of
which it consists. We then have the following result:
Corollary 1. Let fk, f iki , 1 ≤ i ≤ r be as before. Let α0
f1−→ α1 f2−→ · · · fr−→ αr
be an r-round (d+ 1)-polytopic trail. Then
Pr
(
α0
f1K1−−→ α1
f2K2−−→ · · · f
r
Kr−−→ αr
)
=
r∏
i=1
Pr
(
αi−1
fiKi−−→ αi
)
(10)
where x ∈ Fn2 and the Ki are uniformly randomly distributed on their respective
spaces.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the fact that d-differences form a Markov
chain. uunionsq
In most attacks though, we are attacking one fixed key and can not average
the attack over all keys. Thus the following assumption is necessary:
Hypothesis of stochastic equivalence. Let f be as above. The hypothesis
of stochastic equivalence then refers to the assumption that the probability of
any polytopic trail α0
f1−→ α1 f2−→ · · · fr−→ αr is roughly the same for the large
majority of keys:
Pr
(
α0
f1K1−−→ α1
f2K2−−→ · · · f
r
Kr−−→ αr
)
≈ Pr
(
α0
f1k1−−→ α1
f2k2−−→ · · · f
r
kr−−→ αr
)
(11)
for almost all tuples of round keys (k1, k2, . . . , kr).
B Truncated polytopic transitions and higher-order
differentials
In this section, we extend the definition of truncated differentials to polytopic
transitions and prove that higher-order differentials are a special case of these.
We then gauge the cryptographic ramifications of this.
In accordance with usual definitions for standard truncated differentials (see
for example [6], we define:
Definition 10. A truncated d-difference is an affine subspace of the space of
d-differences. A truncated (d+1)-polytopic transition is a pair (A,B) of truncated
d-differences, mostly denoted as A f−→ B. The probability of a truncated (d+ 1)-
polytopic transition (A,B) is defined as the probability that an input d-difference
chosen uniformly randomly from A maps to a d-difference in B:
Pr
(
A
f−→ B
)
:= |A|−1
∑
α∈A
β∈B
Pr
(
α
f−→ β
)
(12)
As the truncated input d-difference is usually just a single d-difference, the prob-
ability of a truncated differential is then just the probability that this input
d-difference maps to any of the output d-differences in the output truncated
d-difference. With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the truncated poly-
topic transition then also as α f−→ B where α is the single d-difference of the
input truncated d-difference.
A particular case of a truncated d-difference is the case where the individual
differences of the d-differences always add up to the same value. This is in fact
just the kind of d-differences one is interested in when working with higher-order
derivatives. We refer here to Lai’s original paper on higher-order derivatives [22]
and Knudsen’s paper on higher-order differentials [19] for reference and notation.
Theorem 2. A differential of order t is a special case of a truncated 2t-polytopic
transition. In particular, its probability is the sum of the probabilities of all 2t-
polytopic trails that adhere to the truncated 2t-polytopic transition.
Proof. Let f : Fn2 → Fn2 . Let (α1, . . . , αt) be the set of linearly independent
differences that are used as the base for our derivative. Let L(α1, . . . , αt) denote
the linear space spanned by these differences. Let furthermore β be the output
difference we are interested in. The probability of the t-th order differential
∆α1,...,αtf(X) = β is then defined as the probability that∑
γ∈L(α1,...,αt)
f(X⊕ γ) = β (13)
holds with X being a random variable, uniformly distributed on Fn2 .
Let B now be the truncated (2t − 1)-difference defined as
B :=
(δ1, . . . , δ2t−1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2t−1∑
i=1
δi = β
 .
Let γ1, γ2, . . . , γ2t−1 be an arbitrary ordering of the non-zero elements of the
linear space L(α1, . . . , αt) and let α = (γ1, . . . , γ2t−1) be the (2t − 1)-difference
consisting of these. We will then show that the probability of the t-th order differ-
ential (α1, . . . , αt, β) is equal to the the probability of the truncated 2t-polytopic
transition α f−→ B. With X being a random variable, uniformly distributed on
Fn2 , we have
Pr
(
α
f−→ B
)
= Pr
X
2t−1∑
i=1
(
f(X⊕ γi)⊕ f(X)
)
= β

= Pr
X
2t−1∑
i=1
(
f(X⊕ γi)
)
⊕ f(X) = β

= Pr
X
 ∑
γ∈L(α1,...,αt)
(
f(X⊕ γ)
)
= β

which proves the theorem. uunionsq
Example. Let α1 and α2 be two differences with respect to which we want to
take the second order derivative and let β be the output value we are interested
in. The probability that ∆α1,α2f(X) = β for uniformly randomly chosen X is
then nothing else than the probability that the 3-difference (α1, α2, α1 ⊕ α2) is
mapped to a 3-difference (β1, β2, β3) with β1 ⊕ β2 ⊕ β3 = β.
This theoretical connection between truncated and higher-order differentials
has an interesting consequence: a higher-order differentials can be regarded as the
union of polytopic trails. This principally allows us to determine lower bounds
for the probability of higher-order differentials by summing over the probabilities
of a subset of all polytopic trails that it contains – just as we are used to from
standard differentials.
As shown in Lemma 2, the probability of a (d + 1)-polytopic trail is always
at most as high as the probability of the worst standard differential trail that
it contains. A situation in which the probability of a higher-order differential
at the same time is dominated by a single polytopic trail and has a higher
probability than any ordinary differential can thus never occur. To find a higher-
order differential with a higher probability than any ordinary differential for
a given cipher, we are thus always forced to sum over many polytopic trails.
Whether this number can remain manageable for a large number of rounds will
require further research and is beyond the scope of this paper.
